Karl Kjer Share his knowledge In Mav 2000, Matthew Meselson, an issue related to biological weapons, leading figure in the life sciences on issues related to biological weapons, offered a warning at the annual meeting of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. Every major technology-metallurgy, explosives, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy has been internal combustion, intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also with biotechnology, certain to for hostile ones. Must this also be a dominant technology of the next century? During the century just modify fundamental life processes continues its rap in, as our ability to aid advance, we will ways to destroy life but will also be able to manipulate it including the processes of cognition, development, reproduction, and inheritance. A world in which these capabilities are widely employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of conflict has radically changed.
Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression, or subjugation. Concerns about the potential security risks posed by life sciences research can be seen in the context of rising concerns and sometimes ty sharp disagreements about the more general risks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological weapons and bioterrorism, following the end of the Cold War (see, for example, Carter, Deutch, and Zelikov 1998). More specifically, a number of articles in scientific journals early in this decade sparked controversy about whether the risks cited by Meselson were already present, with critics charging that the publications could provide a "blueprint" or "roadmap" for nations or terrorists.?
Yet even work with the greatest seeming potential for misuse most often also offers significant potential benefits, and judgments about the implications of research were seldom simple or definitive. Box 1-1 contains examples of some of the contentious articles; in every case the reality and extent of the risk were vigorously debated. The possibilities and attendant uncertainties-regarding whether and how advances in the life sciences intended for legitimate and beneficent purposes might also be used for malevolent ends has come to be called the "dual use dilemma", a term that is the subject of considerable debate. For the purposes of the workshop, Professor Michael Imperiale, a member of the NRC organizing committee and the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) (see below), presented and discussed definitions of several key concepts as an aid to common understandings during the first plenary session.
Dual Use Research: In the life sciences, dual use refers to the possible beneficial or malevolent use of reagents, organisms, technologies, or information. Learning things is not limited to the scentific area. Instead it also has relations with some other things like speaking a language or using software, including Rosetta Stone Japanese and Rosetta Stone Korean. If you have a creative mind, you will make all your own differences in the end!
Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression, or subjugation. Concerns about the potential security risks posed by life sciences research can be seen in the context of rising concerns and sometimes ty sharp disagreements about the more general risks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological weapons and bioterrorism, following the end of the Cold War (see, for example, Carter, Deutch, and Zelikov 1998). More specifically, a number of articles in scientific journals early in this decade sparked controversy about whether the risks cited by Meselson were already present, with critics charging that the publications could provide a "blueprint" or "roadmap" for nations or terrorists.?
Yet even work with the greatest seeming potential for misuse most often also offers significant potential benefits, and judgments about the implications of research were seldom simple or definitive. Box 1-1 contains examples of some of the contentious articles; in every case the reality and extent of the risk were vigorously debated. The possibilities and attendant uncertainties-regarding whether and how advances in the life sciences intended for legitimate and beneficent purposes might also be used for malevolent ends has come to be called the "dual use dilemma", a term that is the subject of considerable debate. For the purposes of the workshop, Professor Michael Imperiale, a member of the NRC organizing committee and the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) (see below), presented and discussed definitions of several key concepts as an aid to common understandings during the first plenary session.
Dual Use Research: In the life sciences, dual use refers to the possible beneficial or malevolent use of reagents, organisms, technologies, or information. Learning things is not limited to the scentific area. Instead it also has relations with some other things like speaking a language or using software, including Rosetta Stone Japanese and Rosetta Stone Korean. If you have a creative mind, you will make all your own differences in the end!
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